

January 2025
Ukraine Monthly Situation Report

CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS

- According to an OSINT analysis conducted by DeepState, the pace of the Russian army's advance in January was slower than in December and November 2024 (over 6,200 assaults in December compared to 4,500 in January in different areas of the frontline). Also, according to DeepState, in January the Russian army managed to capture much less Ukrainian territory (270 square kilometres) when compared to November (792 km) and December (400 km). Some experts believe that this is because (in part at least) the current pace of replenishing the ranks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) is slower than that of Russian losses. Therefore, the Russians lack people to carry-out assaults. **According to the Ukrainian government, the total losses incurred by the Russian Federation (Russia) as of the end of December 2024 stood at [836.000](#) soldiers. In January, the AFRF were sustaining losses of around 1,500 soldiers a day.**

- Russia continues to use cruise missiles and kamikaze drones to launch air attacks on Ukrainian settlements and energy infrastructure. In December the cities of [Kyiv](#), [Zaporizhzhia](#), [Sumy](#), [Chernihiv](#), [Kharkiv](#), [Mykolayiv](#), [Dnipro](#), [Odesa](#), [Izmail](#), [Beryslav](#), [Vushneve](#), [Kupyansk](#), [Uman](#), [Kryvyi Rih](#), [Pavlohrad](#), [Kramatorsk](#), [Kostyantynivka](#), [Pokrovsk](#) and other settlements were subject to air attacks.

- In view of the zone of intensive shelling expanding, the zone of [forcible evacuation](#) of families with children in the Donetsk and Kharkiv provinces follows suit. The head of the Dnipropetrovsk province military administration has [called on](#) the citizens living in communities close to the front line to evacuate, given that the frontline is approaching the borders of Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk provinces.

- The Ukraine Defence Forces continue to launch strikes on the Russian oil industry facilities that are being used to sustain Russia's military capacity. For example, according to the media, following the attacks on Russia's Port Ust-Luga, which was ensuring up to 20% of Russia's oil export by sea, the transfer of oil to the ports terminals [has effectively been suspended](#) for repair works. Additionally, the Novoshakhtinski oil refinery [has also ceased its operations](#) due to the attacks in the second half of December. On 27 January, it was reported that the Ryazan oil refinery was also [suspending its operations](#) following drone attacks. Furthermore, on 29 January, the Nizhegorodnski oil refinery [was damaged](#). Attacks are being carried out on staffs, depots, airfields and other military facilities throughout Russian territory and in the occupied territories of Ukraine.

- On 25 January, Russian media outlets released a [video](#) showing Russians soldiers executing six Ukrainian prisoners of war (PoWs). Russia continues to execute PoWs despite constant appeals by the Ukrainian government to the international institutions, whose task is to ensure that the principles of international humanitarian law are adhered to – but apparently, they are powerless to stop Russia from carrying out this heinous war crime. For its part, in January the Ukrainian government reintroduced the possibility for Russian PoWs to call their relatives back homes in Russia.

- **On 15 January, Ukraine and Russia [swapped prisoners of war](#).** Twenty-five members of the Ukrainian armed forces returned home. Most of them have been badly wounded and are sick. Among those who returned were defenders of the Azov steel plant, Mariupol, the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant, Zmiinyi island and those who were fighting in different areas of the front. Prior to that, on 10 January, Ukraine managed to [return](#) 17 civilians.
- **On 24 January, Ukraine [brought back](#) the bodies of 757 fallen soldiers.** 34 of them came from morgues located in Russia, while other bodies were being preserved in Ukraine's occupied territories.
- **According to the estimates of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, Russia is illegally [detaining](#) over 20.000 Ukrainian civilians.** This figure exceeds the number of detained Ukrainian PoWs.

HUMANITARIAN DIMENSIONS

- **According to the official information provided by juvenile prosecutors,** over 2,337 Ukrainian children have been [affected](#) by Russian armed aggression. As of January 2025, 596 children have been killed with over 1,741 wounded with various degrees of severity. 154,151 war crimes and crimes of aggression have been registered as well as 20,444 crimes against national security. Almost 30.000 military personnel and civilians have gone missing since the beginning of 2024. Ukraine continues to search for [another](#) 59.000 Ukrainians. In the autumn of 2024, Russian attacks [claimed](#) the lives of 574 Ukrainian civilians. The Russian occupiers have [forcibly relocated](#) twelve children from the temporarily occupied city of Khartsyzk (Donetsk province) to Moscow for the so-called 'Christmas holidays'. All of them were residing in a Khartsyzk 'social' shelter which house those who had lost their parents as a result of Russia's invasion.
- **Russia continues to destroy Ukraine's cultural heritage.** As a result of Russia's war, 2,156 cultural infrastructure facilities have been [damaged](#) in Ukraine. Of these 382 were destroyed. On 20 January, 271 historical and cultural sites were [damaged](#) in the Kherson province. Archeological sites of national significance are subject to large-scale destruction. During the war, 148 Ukrainian artists and 96 people working in the media have been [killed](#), as well as 7 foreign journalists who were reporting on developments in Ukraine.
- **The irresponsibility of the Russian occupiers in eliminating the consequences of the catastrophe in the Kerch Strait as well as their use of dilapidated tankers pose a new threat to the environmental security of Ukraine and Europe.** The accident involving two Russian oil tankers, Volgoneft-212 and Volgoneft-239, has caused a large-scale contamination of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, which could have catastrophic environmental consequences for decades to come. As a result of the heavy fuel oil spill, sea mammals along with thousands of birds have been [killed](#). It has also contaminated organisms living in the demersal zone, which jeopardizes the entire chain of the sea ecosystem as the released fuel oil will now move along the maritime food chain, making fish and other wildlife in the sea unsuitable for consumption. Petroleum products can reach the

coasts of Odesa and Mykolayiv. According to preliminary [estimates](#), the spill has resulted in damages of 14 billion USD.

- **Environmental crimes committed by Russia continue to hit Ukraine and the temporarily occupied territories.** Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion, over 7.000 environmental crimes have been [registered](#) causing some 72,9 billion EUR worth of damages. Livadia park in the temporarily occupied Crimea is in steady [decline](#): fountains are destroyed, paths are overgrown with thicket, and streams of sewage are visible all over the park. The occupation authorities do not spend any money on reconstruction. The possible transfer of the park to private property, will only increase the threat of this historical site being destroyed. The contamination of soil because of Russian aggression [has caused some 5.5 UAH of damages](#). Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion 24 criminal proceedings have been [opened](#) in Kherson province against Russia for committing crimes against the environment. The debris of a Russian drone [has damaged](#) a reservoir containing vegetable oil stored by an agricultural company in Mykolayiv, which caused a spill that contaminated the premises and the river of Pivdennyi Buh. The level of damage caused by the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam has [reached](#) about 14 billion USD.

- **The Russian occupiers are [exploiting](#) the port at Mariupol to export stolen fossil fuels.** Within 11 days in January, Russia sent two sea bulk carriers with stolen coal from the occupied territories. They have also prepared another dock for bulk materials to be shipped.

- **In the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, the Russian occupiers have increased reprisals against civilians, including by conducting massive searches, detaining people and forcing them to take Russian passports.** In Nova Kakhovka and the surrounding villages, the Russian occupiers along with the Federal Security Service agents are [conducting](#) searches, breaking down doors and looking for pro-Ukrainian residents. In 2024, in Crimea 111 unlawful detentions, 173 arrests and 61 searches were [registered](#), with the brunt of the reprisals being borne by Crimean Tatars. From 5 February onwards, Ukrainians who have not received Russian passports, will not be able to get married, and also [run the risk](#) of being deported.

- **The Russian occupiers systematically take measures aimed at Russifying children residing in the temporarily occupied territories, sending them to participate in propaganda programs in Russia or engaging them in military training.** 500 children from the occupied province of Luhansk [will be sent](#) on 'cultural trips' to Russia so that they assimilate and change their identity. 119 schoolchildren from Mariupol have been [transported](#) to Saint Petersburg where they will be 're-educated' under the influence of Russian propaganda. In the Zaporizhzhia province, the occupiers are [establishing](#) classes that will be sewing camouflage nets and repairing drones for the Russian army. Money that was meant to cover children's education will be spent on the work of these classes. The Russian secret services [are taking](#) Ukrainian children into their custody, transforming them into future propagandists, military personnel or agents of influence.

- **Russia is forcibly mobilising Ukrainians, deploying them in the war.** In 2024, over 10,000 Ukrainians from the temporarily occupied territories were forcibly [conscripted](#) into the Russian army. In Kherson province the occupiers are actively [searching](#) for orphans and children with disabilities to use in the war. The Russians are [forcing](#) the local population to transport ammunition, exploiting them as military 'camels'.

- **Russians continue to destroy Ukrainian culture and introduce Russification.** In occupied Crimea there is [no longer a single school](#) with Ukrainian being the language of instruction. The number of schoolchildren learning Ukrainian has dropped to 0,015%. In the schools of Mariupol children are being [made](#) to make heroes out of Russian soldiers and fighters from the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic', brainwashed with Russian propaganda. In the Kherson province the Russian occupiers are [confiscating](#) Ukrainian books from libraries, replacing them with propaganda literature about the war. The Russian occupiers have also [shelled](#) a monument to Taras Shevchenko in the occupied city of Novohrodivka, continuing to wage war on 'memorials'. 36 Ukrainian museums have been [included](#) in the Russian State Catalogue, with exhibits from these museums being used for propaganda goals and the falsification of history.

- **The occupation authorities are illegally appropriating Ukrainian lands, real estate, and enterprises, by evicting the locals and populating the region with Russian migrants.** In Crimea Russians have [sold](#) the 'nationalised' Ukrainian property for 4,8 billion RUB, including flats, hotels and enterprises. In Luhansk province the occupiers have [deprived](#) Ukrainians of their property rights for 18,000 hectares of land, unless they take Russian passports. In the occupied regions the Russians are actively [bringing in](#) migrants in order to change the demographic balance and reduce the number of pro-Ukrainian population. Ukrainian collaborators in Luhansk province are [threatening](#) to evict people with disabilities, if they refuse to take a Russian passport.

- **The Russian occupants are deliberately restricting the freedom of movement for Ukrainians in the occupied territories, resorting to 'filtration' methods to establish control over the locals.** The Russians are [setting up](#) checkpoints, preventing people without a Russian passport pass. They also check the history of their calls on their phones. The Russian occupants have also [launched](#) a new wave of 'filtration' under the pretext of checking car insurance. In fact, they check IDs and detect those who are 'disloyal'.

ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS

- **[Forecast for 2025 from the National Bank of Ukraine \(NBU\): the inflation rate is expected to drop from mid-2025 onwards, with economic growth gathering pace.](#)** The inflation rate will grow in the coming months. However, from mid-2025 onwards, it will slow down. In late 2025, the inflation rate will stand at 8,4%. At the end of 2026, it is predicted to shrink to 5%.

- **Ukraine's budget has begun to be financed at the expense of '[contingent IOUs](#)'.** According to Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, Ukraine's budget in January 2025 is 3,8 billion US dollars. 3,1 billion USD has come from the EU, with another 700 million being granted by the USA in the form of government bonds issued on the domestic market. The funds received from the EU are the first tranche within the framework of the ERA Loans. These are loans that will be repaid with the interest from Russian frozen assets. In other words, the costs of the loan will be covered by the aggressor country and not by Ukraine. 3,1 billion USD is Ukraine's contingent IOU.

- **[Results of the de-shadowing in 2024 and the forecast for 2025.](#)** According to the head of the Ukrainian Parliament's Committee on Finances, Tax and Customs Policy, Danylo Hetmantsev,

in 2023 Ukraine's state budget received 1,5 billion USD from the procedure of the unshadowing. In 2024 (December excluded), the figure was over 1,6 billion USD or 69 billion UAH. For 2025 Mr. Hetmantsev is expecting the figure to rise to 100 billion UAH. This goes for each sector of the economy and all budget-forming taxes.

- **[200.000 Ukrainians may leave Ukraine in 2025](#)**. Throughout 2024 there was a steady outflow of migrants from Ukraine. Overall, in 2024 500.000 people left Ukraine. In 2025 this trend will continue. According to the estimates of the NBU, another 200.000 people will leave Ukraine. However, 2026 will mark the return of citizens to Ukraine (about 200.000), with the pace growing in 2027 (about half a million).

- **Unemployment and the cost of housing and communal services**. Under the influence of a significant demand for workers, the unemployment rate will diminish. However, it will still exceed the levels prior to the full-scale invasion (approximately 10-11% in 2025-2027) due to the remaining disproportion between the needs of employers and the skills and knowledge of potential employees. The costs of specific housing and communal services for the population (natural gas, heating, and hot water) will remain lower than they would actually need to be in alignment with world gas prices. The moratorium on growing tariffs on specific housing and communal services has also kept the growth of the unemployment rate in check.

- **According to the sector 'Work' on OLX, the median salary in Ukraine stood at [20,000 UAH \(480 dollars\)](#) as of late 2024**. Over 2024, the median salary grew by 12,5%. According to the State Committee on Statistics of Ukraine, as of early December 2024, the inflation rate in Ukraine amounted to 11,2%. The Heads of Ukrainian enterprises are expecting salaries to increase in the coming 12 months.

- **26% of Ukrainian pensioners receive a pension of less than 3,000 UAH. According to the [Pension Fund of Ukraine](#), the average pension in Ukraine as of late 2024 stood at 5,789 UAH**. In 2024, the average pension rose by 7,5%. However, the inflation rate ate into this rise, which, according to the NBU, was 12% in 2024. At the moment, there are 10,34 million pensioners in Ukraine. 26% of them receive a pension of less than 3.000 UAH. The number of pensioners shrank by 497,500 during the three years of the full-scale war, which is roughly the same as after two years of the COVID-19 pandemic. Traditionally, the largest pensions (8,017.65 UAH) are received by residents of Kyiv, which exceeds the average pension throughout Ukraine by more than a third. The smallest pensions are paid in the Ternopil province (4,484.69 UAH), which is 23% less than the average indicator.

- **According to an international survey EoY carried out by Rating Group, the majority of Ukrainians (66%) believe that the [USA will be a super power](#) as of 2030. A bit less than a quarter of respondents holds the opposite view**. 51% of Ukrainians view US foreign policy towards Ukraine positively, whereas 26% think the opposite. Another 12% believe it produces no effect whatsoever, while 11% could not answer this question. On average, Ukrainians more often mention the positive influence exerted by US foreign policy than respondents from other 35 countries. On the whole, Ukraine is on the list of top 5 countries (preceded by Kosovo, India, the Philippines and Columbia) that share optimism with regards to US influence.

- **Political ratings.** On 8 February, it will be one year that Valerii Zaluzhnyi was dismissed from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This was the most high-profile resignation of 2024. Shortly afterwards, from 22 February to 1 March, the centre SOCIS conducted a survey, which was repeated in December 2024 and allowed an insight into the political [dynamics](#). If only those respondents are taken into consideration, who are ready to go to the election polls and cast their votes for a specific candidate, the rating of Valerii Zaluzhnyi dropped from 41,4% to 36,1% over these 9 months. At the same time, Volodymyr Zelenskyy's rating showed a slight growth from 23,7% to 24,3%. The gap between them narrowed from 17,7% to 11,8%. This is a rather significant change. However, one must understand where the voters, who lost their interest in Zaluzhnyi, migrated to. Petro Poroshenko's presidential aspirations have grown from 6,4% to 9,4%, Dmytro Razumkov's rating has grown from 5,6% to 8,3%, while that of Yulia Tymoshenko has shown a growth from 2,8% to 6%. It is worth mentioning that the rating of Serhii Prytula, who is loyal to the Office of the President, has shrunk from 4,1% to 2,9%. As a result, hypothetically in the second round of elections, Zaluzhnyi would come clearly on top. In March 2024 he would have beaten Zelenskyy by 67,5% to 32,5%. In December 2024, the gap would have widened - 68,4% against 31,6%.

INFORMATION WARFARE DIMENSIONS

- **About negotiations, 'peace' on solely Russian terms.** Russia's leadership and President are constantly speaking about their readiness to conduct negotiations. However, they relentlessly keep voicing arguments that preclude such negotiations. They stress the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian leadership, insisting that their attempt to annex Ukrainian territories be acknowledged. Putin does not consider it necessary to take the interests of European countries into consideration during future negotiations. In January, Russian statements overall touched on the apparent readiness to participate in peace talks, at the same time clarifying Russia's stance on the occupied territories and future political and security control over Ukraine. In parallel, messages were spread about Russia not taking the agreements that may potentially be reached during negotiations as legitimate because of Ukrainian leadership. Member of the Russian Security Council and an aide of President Putin, Nikolai Patrushev, has [urged](#) the need to hold negotiations on Ukraine without the participation of other European countries. He claimed that there is nothing Moscow could discuss with London or Brussels. Moscow is insisting on negotiations being held exclusively on the Russian terms, in particular on the issue of captured Ukrainian territories. 'This is out of the question. Territories that were once governed by Kyiv, have now been integrated into Russia', Patrushev said. Ukraine is awaiting its '[unconditional surrender](#)' due to the sheer force of the Russian army. [Putin](#) has accused Ukraine's leadership of being reluctant to hold peace talks in response to Trump's urge to stop the war. In parallel, Russia has spread [messages](#) saying that the 'Ukrainian conflict' is not to be frozen at any cost, blaming countries of the West for making use of the 'hiatus' ostensibly for arming Kyiv and attempting to take revenge (a narrative spread by the Russian [Ministry of Foreign Affairs](#)). Putin has also said that if Trump had not been 'robbed' of his victory in 2020, the so-called 'special military operation' (SMO) may not have started. Putin has also [said](#) that he has always had a businesslike and trustful relationship with Trump. He also [claims](#) that the conflict may end in 45-60 days, 'should Kyiv run out of sponsorship money and ammunition'. He also insists on the illegitimacy of Ukrainian leadership during potential negotiations,

should they begin. This statement was [made](#) as *fait accompli* on the background of Putin's trip to solve other important state issues.

- **Discrediting Ukrainian political leadership.** The key narrative of the Russian leadership regarding the Ukrainian government is that it has lost its legitimacy. Putin [continues](#) talking about the apparent risks that negotiations entail and about the Ukrainian issue being included in the dialogue between Russia, Ukraine and the USA. Putin talks about the potential 'illegitimacy' of President Zelenskyy, hoping that negotiations and results of meetings with him 'can be declared illegitimate'. At the same time, one can [infer](#) from Putin's words that he personally does not want to talk to Zelenskyy. However, he is ready to appoint negotiators. Nevertheless, he keeps repeating his mantra about the illegitimacy of Ukrainian political leadership. He also [claims](#) that Zelenskyy has no right to sign anything (should peace talks get off the ground).

- **The so-called 'new world order'. Rejecting Ukrainian identity and statehood.** Putin's aide, Nikolai Patrushev, has [said](#) that one may not exclude the possibility of Ukraine ceasing to exist by the end of 2025, just like Moldova. Russia continues to insist on the rationality of a big deal between 'big states', without taking into account the positions of other countries. Russia backs the idea of the 'new world order' that existed back during the Cold War. In Russian official propaganda [narratives](#) abound about 'Ukraine being a mere trifle: Trump will offer Russia a historic global deal' and about '[the USA definitely giving up on](#)' Ukraine, with western military corporations having transformed the country into a test range for their weapons.

In various regions, in particular, in Ukraine's temporarily occupied territories, Russia is [spreading](#) messages via its officials, claiming that Ukrainians are not capable of running their own sovereign country since they lack this ability in their 'genetic memory'. Belarusian President, Alexander [Lukashenko](#) has said that Ukraine will not be able to recover from the SMO without Russia's and Belorussia's help and that in the future Ukraine's President should become someone who will act like Stalin and who will make deals and develop relations with Russia. Head of the Russian Historical Society and of Foreign Intelligence Service, Sergey Naryshkin, believes that the historical affiliation of Ukrainian territories is to be taken into account during the discussion of who has rights on them. According to Naryshkin, historians from Eastern Europe will be invited to discuss this topic. 'We will try to invite historians from other countries, from Poland, Hungary and Slovakia'.

- **Diminishing support of Ukraine by countries of the West. 'Aid was not free of charge'.** Anti-European [narratives](#) continue circulating in Russia. According to some, western military corporations (in particular, the German ones) have transformed Ukraine into a test range for their weapons.

- **Sacralizing the war.** Russian propaganda outlets continue to share Moscow's views on the war and the possibility of nuclear weapons being used through the lens of the church, some psychics, etc. In an [interview](#) for these propaganda outlets, the clergymen of the Russian Orthodox Church claimed that pandemics and wars take place as a result of people's sins, which is why God lets them happen. Russian psychics believe that after the SMO ends, 'a golden century' will be awaiting Russia.

- **The so-called 'integration' of Ukrainian temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson provinces.** Putin has [instructed](#) the prosecutor's office to focus its attention on solving the problems faced by the so-called 'new regions' of Russia, including

the need to integrate the so-called 'Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics', Zaporizhzhia and Kherson provinces into Russian legal space.

- Russia continues to engage in the destruction of Ukrainian culture and identity in the temporarily occupied territories. For example, according to the [information](#) provided by Russian occupiers, in 2024 the libraries of Kherson province received 50 million RUB from Russia's federal budget to acquire solely Russian books.

- Russia continues to pressure citizens residing in the temporarily occupied territories to join the Russian army. Residents of the temporarily occupied territories are also engaged in implementing regional plans in Russia aimed at recruiting personnel for the AFRF. A campaign aimed at recruiting residents of Crimea to join the ranks (contract based) of the Russian army [is getting underway](#). According to [Russian occupants](#), the number of those willing to sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defence has grown by 10%.

- **Discrediting the Ukrainian army. Declaring the might of the Russian army.** Russia is spreading the [narratives](#) about disorganisation, weakness of and catastrophic processes in the Ukrainian army. Russian propaganda outlets [quote](#) views of foreign military experts, saying that Ukrainian units 'will not be able to hold out for long' in the Kursk province.

- According to official Russian information, the Russian army continues growing. For instance, military service contracts were concluded with approximately 450.000 people in 2024. [Dmitry Medvedev](#) has claimed that over 40.000 Russian citizens have joined the voluntary units and been deployed to the zone of the so-called SMO.