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Monthly digest

2022

Conflict Developments

Russian troops continue to advance in the Bakhmut direction in the Donetsk oblast, shelling the city of Bakhmut as well as other settlements located on the frontline. This includes Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, Kostyantynivka, Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka. The fate of Mariupol, Severodonetsk, and other destroyed cities in Eastern Ukraine may well befall Bakhmut. Other cities located in different regions of Ukraine have also been subjected to regular shelling, including Mykolayiv, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Voznesensk, Zelenodilsk, Chuhuiv, Kryvyi Rih, Marhanets, Myrhorod, Orikhiv, Nikopol and other settlements, as well as communities in the Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts located on the Russian border.

In September the Russian Federation (hereinafter: Russia) actively started using Iranian drones to attack Odesa and other Ukrainian cities rather than more expensive missiles. This is a new tactical instrument aimed at increasing the number of civilian casualties. Without obtaining the necessary means to counter these drones, Ukraine will not be able to eliminate the risk to its Armed Forces (hereinafter: AFU) and civilian population. In this respect, the delivery of NASAMS air defence systems to Ukraine is crucially important for safety of civilians, as well as for protecting critical infrastructure in large Ukrainian cities. Taken together it should have a positive impact on the economic and humanitarian situation in Ukraine, as well as on the military.

At the end of August, the AFU launched their counteroffensive in the Kherson oblast, and subsequently liberated the strategically important village of Vysokopillya. At the beginning of September, the Ukrainian army also mounted a massive counteroffensive in the Kharkiv oblast, which resulted in the liberation of numerous cities including Izyum, Kupyansk, and Vovchansk. Consequently, the vast majority of the oblast’s territories were liberated. Currently, a counteroffensive is taking place in the Luhansk oblast, where several settlements near to Lysychansk have been liberated. In the Donetsk oblast, the city of Svyatohirsk and several settlements surrounding it have also been liberated. Ukrainian troops are presently fighting around the city of Lyman which is currently controlled by the Russians.

In parallel to the liberation of Ukrainian cities, the government is documenting war crimes committed during Russia’s occupation. Ukrainian law-enforcement units have already gained experience in dealing with similar cases that took place earlier in the Kyiv oblast. Now the documentation work is being carried-out on a more systematic level. For example, after the liberation of Izyum, a mass grave of approximately 450 bodies was unearthed. Some of the bodies showed signs of torture. In addition a further two mass graves were found as well as several other burial sites with the bodies of several local residents. Further information on war crimes is expected to be shared by the government following the liberation of Mariupol and other cities in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Humanitarian Dimensions

The humanitarian situation in both the occupied territories and along the front line remains critical due to a lack of water, gas, electricity, and medicines. Preparations for the heating season in the occupied territories, the territories located close to the front line and in recently liberated territories leave much to be desired. It will be effectively impossible to carry out this process in the cities destroyed by the war. Therefore, civilians from the settlements situated along the front line are being evacuated. According to the Donetsk civil and military administration, about 75% of residents living in the government-controlled territories of the eponymous oblast have already abandoned their homes. At the same time, the Ukrainian government is trying to restore the electricity supply and resume other services in the liberated territories.

 The Russian government has resorted to a massive mobilisation having failed to achieve any major successes on the front, with its army having incurred significant losses. Officially the goal is to draft 300.000 men into the army. The unofficial goal is 1 million or even more, depending on campaign needs. Apart from Russian citizens, the mobilisation is also affecting residents of Ukraine’s occupied territories, in particular the Crimean Tatars. Mobilisation of residents in the occupied territories is a violation of international humanitarian law and will lead to heavy losses of both Russian and Ukrainian citizens. In fact, the forcible mobilisation of Ukrainian citizens is a new instrument of genocide and war crimes implemented by Russia. According to Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, these are not merely crimes against international law and law of Ukraine, these are crimes committed against specific people “and against the people of Ukraine”.

 In the occupied settlements, representatives of the occupation administration are being subjected to violence (underground fighters may be behind it, or it could be the result of a struggle between different interest groups). For example, in Berdyansk on 16 September, the Deputy Head of the occupation administration, Oleh Boiko, and his wife were killed. The “general prosecutor of the Luhansk People’s Republic”, Serhii Horenko, was killed in Luhansk. On 19 September one of the policemen collaborating with the Russians, Denys Stefankov, was murdered in Melitopol. According to the media, on 25 September, the former Ukrainian MP representing the Party of Regions, Oleksii Zhuravko, was killed as a result of a strike launched by the AFU on a hotel in Kherson. This confirms the inability of Russian administrations to ensure normal life, even for local collaborators.

 On 21 September, with the mediation of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other partners, 215 soldiers were returned to Ukraine from Russian captivity. 205 Ukrainian soldiers were freed from Russian captivity. 108 of them are fighters from the “Azov‘ battalion” in particular, the command staff of the military units that were defending Mariupol. Aside from Ukrainian soldiers, 10 foreign fighters who fought for the AFYU were also liberated. This included citizens of the USA, United Kingdom, Morocco, Sweden and Croatia. In a further exchange of prisoners on 2 September, another 14 Ukrainian soldiers returned home. However, thousands of Ukrainian prisoners of war (hereinafter: POWs) are still being held in Russian captivity, with their well-being and lives in danger. On 19 September, another explosion took place at the Olenivska penal colony where Ukrainian POWs were detained. Once again it was Russia which reported the dead and wounded, after refusing to grant access to the scene of the accident to international missions.

The Ukrainian government is trying to resume its operations in the liberated territories as soon as possible. For example, it has appointed heads of military administrations who are tasked with restoring the functioning of the state apparatus, including providing services for citizens and ensuring security. Following the liberation of these territories, questions related to reintegration, demining, demilitarization, transitional justice and of holding collaborators to account have arisen.

The new school year has brought a new challenge to the education system, namely, how soon can the system be restored. The system has not collapsed. Its elements are gradually being restored in a hybrid format, which can also be explained by the fact that 13.000 teachers and hundreds of thousands of schoolchildren now live abroad. At the same time, students cannot be accommodated in dormitories that do not have bomb shelters. The funds allocated may be insufficient to construct bomb shelters in education facilities.

Political and Economic Dimensions

From 23-27 September Russia organised “referendums” in the occupied territories of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Kharkiv and Mykolayiv oblasts (in the latter only one territorial community is occupied, but this did not deter Russians from organising a “referendum” there). Once the results of these “referendums” are announced, Moscow is expected to declare these territories part of Russia. It is possible that the Kremlin will then introduce martial law and continue mobilisation. Russian President, Vladimir Putin, has made statements that are blatant nuclear blackmail.

The Ukrainian government remains vulnerable to the shadow impact of various political and economic interest groups motivated by vested interests. This problem was highlighted in a statement made by the G7 ambassadors in Ukraine. They expressed their concern about government interference in the operations of the LLC “Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine” and the National Power Company “Ukrenergo”. The fact that Ukraine’s leadership has failed to react to this statement may confirm that the Ukrainian government is being forced to serve the groups interests, even at the cost of increasing tension with its partners on which the delivery of military aid for Ukraine depends. Russia may also exploit the statement of the ambassadors could also, in its (dis)information/propaganda campaigns, with the goal of influencing public opinion in Western countries. For Russian propaganda purposes, this statement backs up the Kremlin’s messages calling on Western governments to stop spending their taxpayers’ money on “the corrupted government of Ukraine”.

Head of the President’s Office of Ukraine, Andriy Yermak, and the former Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, have presented a draft agreement on security guarantees for Ukraine. This document is being actively discussed in both Ukrainian and Russian political circles and among experts.

In addition to objects of civilian infrastructure, objects of critical infrastructure providing energy and other life supporting services are being subjected to shelling. On 12 September massive missile strikes were launched on energy infrastructure objects located in the Kharkiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts. As a result, these oblasts were completely or partly cut- off from electricity for several hours. On 15 September, the Karachunivsk Dam on the Inhulets river in Kryvyi Rih was shelled several times. This led to parts of the city being flooded (the Russians may have done this to slow the AFU’s counteroffensive in the Kherson oblast). On 17-18 September a thermal power station in Slovyansk was subjected to shelling. On the night of 19 September the Russian army launched missiles on the industrial zone of the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant located in the Mykolayiv oblast. A major explosion occurred 300 meters from the power plant’s reactors. The shock waves damaged the plant’s main building, smashing windows and disabling some of the plant’s equipment. On 1 September the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mission, headed by Rafael Grossi, made a several-day visit to the premises of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant despite Russia carrying-out provocations and shelling.

 More than one month after the “grain corridor” was set up, Ukraine has managed to export 2.5 million tons of grain through its 3 ports, which exceeded all expectations. However, this year’s export volume is much lower than usual due to the Russian naval blockade. Because of Russia’s invasion, the grain harvest may also shrink by 30 million tons this year, which represents about 30% of last year’s result.

 In September the Ukrainian government adopted the 2023 state budget and subsequently sent the draft to the Parliament. The budget’s main priorities are Ukraine’s security and defense, although the government has also pledged not to reduce social payments.

Information Warfare Dimensions

In September, Russian official discourse regarding Ukraine has become increasingly radicalized. New narratives justifying mobilisation and the use of nuclear weapons have been circulated. On 7 September, at the plenary session of the Eastern Economic Forum, President Putin said (having deployed the “rhetoric of final warnings”) that Russia “has not lost anything” and that “in terms of gains… our main gain is our strengthened sovereignty, which is an inevitable result of current developments”. In his appeal to fellow Russians on 21 September, Putin, among other things, said that “to protect Russia and our people we will use without a doubt all means available to us. This is not a bluff”. He also mentioned the complicated situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

In terms of social and economic developments, the Kremlin has been proactively explaining the necessity of the total and complete support and unification of Russian society to respond to threats posed by the West. Messages backing the aggression and denouncing those who doubt the expediency of Putin’s actions, have been spread. Ultra-right narratives justifying the genocide of the Ukrainian people and the use of weapons of mass destruction against Ukraine, have made their way into Russia’s public discourse. Russian state TV channels have started inviting representatives of Russian far-right groups (Girkin, aka Strelkov) to their shows. Russian propagandists have also been justifying (and calling for) the destruction of Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. Kremlin Spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, has emphasized that “the special military operation will continue until all of its original goals are reached”.

At the official level Russia continues to deny the defeat of its army in the Kharkiv oblast. Russia’s leadership has claims that President Putin has the situation under control and that he receives reports about all developments vis-à-vis the special military operation (hereinafter: SMO), including those regarding the regrouping of Russian troops. Moscow continues to deny the killing of civilians in Izyum, claiming that the West has staged “another Bucha massacre”. Russian far-right groups are actively disseminating narratives on Telegram channels, criticising Russian military commanders and expressing distrust in “Russian generals”.

On 21 September President Putin signed a decree on partial mobilisation. In an appeal to the nation he said “I support the proposal of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff about partial mobilisation in the Russian Federation”. The need to carry out such a mobilisation has been blamed on the West. The Kremlin claims that the West poses a threat to Russian sovereignty. The initial goal is to mobilise 300.000 thousand men. However, the actual number – mentioned in a secret article of the decree – is 1 million.

Following the news of a “partial mobilization”, massive protests began across Russia (in Dagestan, the Sakha Republic and Bashkortostan). Representatives of indigenous peoples in Russia have stated that Russia is disproportionally targeting ethnic minorities with mobilisation notices. Such a policy is defined as genocide under international law. According to independent analysts, in Crimea, Russia is disproportionately drafting Crimean Tatars, with the local occupation administration having already mobilized 60.000 people. Moreover, draft letters are being handed out in settlements with predominantly Tatar populations.

Although protests against mobilisation are taking place, they have not become widespread, and are mainly taking place in Russia’s far-flung regions. According to human rights activists, on 25 September 25 almost 800 people were detained (the number of detainees was a little short of that “achieved” by Russians right after the mobilisation was announced on 21 September). Some Russian analysts have pointed to the growing protest dynamics, including protests by women against the mobilisation in the regions. There have also been cases of Russian recruitment offices being set on fire, protests of women and the killing of conscription officers. Russians are fleeing from Russia to Georgia, Kazakhstan and Mongolia en masse. People are still waiting in multiple-kilometer-long queues on the border. The primary goal is to avoid mobilisation. These people are not necessarily against the war. Information is being spread on social networks about Russian law enforcement units carrying-out raids in small towns and in rural regions. At the same time official Russia media and Telegram channels, which are loyal to the Russian government, are spreading propaganda about support for the mobilisation. The authorities in Dagestan, Chechnya and Crimea have reported the completion of mobilisation measures in their respective regions.

Illegal referendums are being held in the partly occupied territories of Ukraine. There are countless videos showing people voting under the “supervision” of Russian soldiers. The election process is also taking place in Russian territories, where 600 polling stations have been set up, according to the Russian Central Election Commission. Russia claims that the turnout of over 50% attests to the “referendums on the accession of new territories to Russia” having been successfully held. The annexation of Ukrainian territories is also believed to be very possible, something which increases the chances of a nuclear escalation.

Putin’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit is being portrayed as a victory in Russia, and that the support expressed by other participating countries for Russia’s actions will boost the Russian economy, given that the majority of world’s population live in the SCO countries. Russian officials have spoken about potential peace talks only being possible based on a “position of strength and meeting all the goals of the SMO”. According to the statement made by the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, on 12 September, the current negotiation position of Russia on Ukraine “is a mere warm-up leading up to future demands

the total surrender of Kyiv”. Following the talks held at the SCO summit, on 16 September Putin spoke about resolving the situation in Ukraine, while also accusing Ukraine’s government of having a lack of will to conduct peace negotiations. On 16 September Putin reiterated that the plan of the SMO in Ukraine was not subject to change, with the Russian General Staff making operative decisions. According to Putin, the main goal of the SMO is the liberation of all territories of Donbas. Putin said that this goal was being pursued despite “the counteroffensive attempts undertaken by the Ukrainian army”. However, at the SCO summit Putin made no mention of Ukraine’s denazification. Nevertheless, Russia’s information space continues allowing calls for the genocide of Ukrainians voiced on Russian federal TV channels (Russia 24, Russia 1 and others).

 Narratives regarding “Ukraine fatigue” in the West have also been circulated. The Kremlin promotes a narrative of the West “being incapable of taking care of global challenges and issues of international cooperation, due to the situation in Ukraine”. In parallel to this, Russia is spreading information about a social and economic crisis in Ukraine, rising social unrest and the number of people who do not share President Zelenskyy’s viewpoint. Moscow is exploiting issues related to the energy crisis in Europe, placing the blame fully on Europe.

Russia has been vigorously emphasising the abysmal implementation of the “grain agreements”. The Kremlin has voiced doubts about their prolongation in November. According to Moscow, Ukrainian grain has not been transported to the countries envisaged by Russia. On 7 September similar accusations were voiced by the President Putin. On 9 September these stories were also shared by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This Ukraine Situation Report is prepared in the framework of the project “Building Resilience in Conflict Through Dialogue” funded by the European Union

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